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Rachel Briley*

I. Introduction
The following is an update on Louisiana’s legislative activity and notable
case law relating to oil, gas, and mineral law, from August 1, 2017 to July
31, 2018.

* Rachel Briley is an associate in The Woodlands office of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC.
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II. Case Law
A. Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine
Grace Ranch LLC, v. BP America Production Company.1
Grace Ranch, LLC (“Grace Ranch”), the owner of 40 acres in Jefferson
Davis Parish, filed suit against J.P. Van Way (“JPVW”), BP American
Production Company (“BP”), and BHP Billiton Petroleum (Americas), Inc.
(“BHP”) for damaging its property as a result of oil and gas exploration and
production.2 Ellen M. Davies, the predecessor in title to Grace Ranch, LLC,
executed a mineral lease in 1944, which was subsequently assigned to BP
and JPVW.3 The lease expired in 1985 due to non-production.4 Grace
Ranch obtained one-half (1/2) of the minerals in 2009 from General Farms
and one-half (1/2) of the other minerals due to the expiration of Daniel and
Jeralyn Ewings’ mineral servitude.5 Grace Ranch obtained assignments of
rights in tort and contract from the previous mineral owners.6 Subsequently,
Grace Ranch filed suit to assert its claims.
The trial court dismissed Grace Ranch’s suit with prejudice on the basis
of the subsequent purchaser rule and failed to find that Grace Ranch had a
right of action even though Grace Ranch had obtained assignments from its
predecessors in title, specifically finding that the assignment from General
Farms to Grace Ranch was invalid based on General Farm’s affidavit of
dissolution.7 The Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of JPVW, BHP, and BP.8
The Third Circuit looked to Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc. v Amerada Hess
Corp., 10-2267, 10-2272, 10-2275, 10-2279, 10-2289, p.8 (La.
10/25/11);79 So.3d 246, 256-257, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that the right to sue for damage to property is a personal right held by
the landowner who owned the property at the time the damage occurred
unless such right was assigned or subrogated to a subsequent purchaser.9
Grace Ranch argued that this analysis was inapplicable to the situation at
1. Grace Ranch, LLC v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 17-1144 (La. App. 3 Cir. 7/18/18); 2018
WL 3454981.
2. Id. at p. 1, *1.
3. Id. at p. 1-3, *1-2.
4. Id. at p. 2, *2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at p. 4-5, *3.
8. Id. at p. 19, *10-*11.
9. Id. at p. 5, *3.
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hand since Eagle Pipe involved surface rights only.10 However, the Third
Circuit found that the subsequent purchaser rule had been applied to
mineral leases since Eagle Pipe. In Boone v. Conoco Phillips Co., 13-1196
(La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/14);139 So.3d 1047, the current landowners sued a
lessee for damage to property as a result of drilling operations that had
occurred prior to when the plaintiffs acquired the property.11 The Boone
court held, and the Fifth Circuit agreed, that pursuant to the subsequent
purchaser doctrine, the current landowners had no right of action for
contamination that occurred prior when they owned the land.12
Grace Ranch also argued that the trial court erred in applying the
jurisprudential subsequent purchaser rule when the Civil Code and Mineral
Code, specifically La.R.S. 31:16, provides a right of action.13 The court
found that La.R.S. 31:16 created a real property right in the mineral lessee,
and not the mineral lessor.14 Therefore, the mineral lease did not create a
right that ran with the land which would allow a landowner to sue for
property damage.15 Grace Ranch also argued that the working interest
owners violated an implied obligation of the lessees under La.R.S. 31:122
which binds a lessee to “perform the contract in good faith and to develop
and operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent operator.”16
However, the court found that the obligation did not include a duty to
restore the surface unless the plaintiff could prove that the defendants had
acted unreasonably or excessively.17
The appellate court also found that Grace Ranch did not obtain an
assignment of the right to sue from previous owners.18 The trial court
found, and the appellate court affirmed, that at the time that General Farms
assigned its claims, it had dissolved as a corporation, and therefore, could
not assign any claim as it did not “maintain any claims or causes of action
to assert on its own behalf and therefore [has] nothing to assign.”19

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at p. 5-6, *3.
Id. at p. 6, *3.
Id.
Id. at p. 9-10, *7-8.
Id. at.
Id.
Id.
Id. at p. 10, *6.
Id. at p. 14, *8.
Id.
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B. Trespass
Chauvin v. Shell Oil Company20
The plaintiffs owned land located in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana and
filed a suit for trespass and sought damages caused by pipelines that were
put in by the defendants over the a thirty-two year period.21 Shell Oil
Company (“Shell Oil”), one of the defendants, had bought the disputed
property in 1971 from the plaintiff’s predecessors in title and had
subsequently granted servitudes to the other defendant pipeline carriers. 22
The plaintiffs became aware of their ownership of the property when
several companies contacted them seeking to obtain servitudes over the
property.23 The defendants sought for summary judgment by arguing that
the plaintiffs could not prove that they owned the property. The district
court granted the summary judgment and dismissed the claims brought by
the plaintiffs.24
Shell Oil had bought two tracts of land in 1971, Parcel A, containing
3.71 acres, and Parcel B, containing 3.70 acres, and had granted multiple
servitudes over that property.25 However, the language in the contract was
unclear as to where the boundary of the tracts lied, specifically, if the
boundaries included the property where the pipelines now lie.26 The
plaintiffs argued that the defendant’s pipelines were not included in the
boundaries of the 1971 contract, and the defendants argued that the
pipelines were located on the 1971 contract property.27 The plaintiffs
argued that there was a question of material fact as to “the extent” of the
property sold in 1971.28
In order to determine where the boundaries were, the court first looked
toward the reference to the survey in the deed; however, the survey did not
clearly show where the boundaries of parcels were in relation to the rightof-ways that Shell Oil had granted.29 Consequently, the court looked to
extrinsic evidence, including testimony from the parties surveyors.30 The
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Chauvin v. Shell Oil Co., 16-609 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/25/17); 231 So. 3d. 903.
Id. at p. 2-3, 231 So. 3d at 905, 911.
Id.
Id. at p.4, 231 So.3d at 906.
Id. at p.2, 231 So.3d at 905.
Id. at p. 3-4, 231 So.3d at906.
Id. p. 6-7, 231 So.3d at 908.
Id.
Id. at p.5, 231 So.3d at 907.
Id. at p. 7-8, 231 So.3d at 908.
Id. at p. 8-9, 231 So.3d at 908-909.
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plaintiffs’ surveyor stated that he was unable to determine where the
boundaries of the parcels were, but despite his testimony, the plaintiffs’
surveyor was able to draft a survey map, which included the right of ways
within the boundaries of the parcels.31
The court also found that the numerous actions taken by Shell Oil on the
property in conjunction with the lack of action that the plaintiffs and their
predecessors in title took, suggested that Shell Oil did indeed obtain title to
the property that is in dispute.32 When selling the property surrounding the
property in dispute, the predecessors in title to the plaintiffs never included
the property that was in dispute, suggesting that they did intend to sell Shell
Oil the disputed property.33 Shell Oil, on the other hand, had granted
servitudes to Shell Pipeline in 1980, Southern States, Inc. in 1981, Entergy
Louisiana, Inc. in 1997, and Air Products in 1996 and 2012.34 Shell Pipeline
had also been maintaining the servitude by posting signage and removing
brush and vegetation twice a year.35
Finally, the court also determined that Shell Oil also obtained ownership
over the property through acquisitive prescription, finding that Shell Oil
satisfied all requirements for ownership over a thirty year acquisitive
prescription.36 In order to meet the requirements, the acquisition must be
“continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public, and unequivocal corporeal
possession.”37 The court found that Shell Oil had met all of these
requirements by granting servitudes that had been maintained for a thirtytwo year period.38
C. Duty to Prevent Erosion of Pipeline Canals
Vintage Assets, Inc. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C.39
Plaintiffs owned a piece of property over which the defendants had eight
right-of-way servitudes that were granted to their predecessors from 1953 to
1970.40 Several of those servitudes contained language that stated the canals
31. Id.
32. Id. at p. 10, 231 So.3d 910.
33. Id. at p. 8-9, 231 So.3d at 909.
34. Id. at p. 10, 231 So.3d at 910.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at p. 11, 231 So.3d 910 (citing La. C.C. art. 3476; La. C.C. art. 3486).
38. Id. at p. 11, 231 So.3d at 911.
39. Vintage Assets, Inc. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., No. 16-713, 2016 WL
3601215 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2017).
40. Id. at *1.
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in which the pipelines were laid may not exceed a certain width.41 Two
right-of-ways did not contain any language that stated the canals were “not
to exceed” a certain width.42 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants did
not maintain the canals, which resulted in the canals eroding and damaging
the property.43 The plaintiffs brought a trespass, breach of contract, and
negligence claim against the defendants.44 The court dismissed the trespass
and negligence claims, but found for the plaintiff in their breach of contract
claim as to the contracts that contained “not to exceed” language, finding
that the defendants had a duty to maintain canals.45The plaintiffs argued
that the defendants committed trespass by failing to adhere to the “not to
exceed” language contained in the servitudes and allowing the canals to
erode.46 The defendants argued that in order to “trespass,” they had to take
an affirmative action, and that failing to maintain a canal was a passive, not
active action.47 The court followed the Louisiana Supreme Court’s analysis
in Hogg v. Chevron USA Inc.48, agreeing with the defendants that the
plaintiff had to show that the trespasser had to take an affirmative action.
The district court found that failing to maintain the canals was more of an
act of negligence and was insufficient as to support a claim of trespass.49
As to the breach of contract claim, the defendants argued that the
contracts for the servitudes allowed the canals to be “open,” which meant
that the pipeline owners had no duty to maintain the canal banks.50 Instead,
they only had a duty to maintain the pipelines. The defendants argued that
the “not to exceed” language contained in the agreements for the canals was
only applicable at the time of construction of the rights-of-way and did not
create a continuing duty to maintain the canals.51 The plaintiffs argued that
the contract was breached when the canals began to exceed the widths
established in the rights-of-way agreement.52 The court found that since the
contracts were ambiguous, they had to look to suppletive servitude rules,
41. Id. at *1-2.
42. Id. at *2.
43. Id. at *1.
44. Id.
45. See ud. at *9.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2009-2632, 2009-2635, p.15 (La. 7/6/10); 45 So.3d
991, 1002.
49. Vintage, 2016 WL 3601215 at *4.
50. Id. at *5.
51. Id.
52. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss3/8

2018]

Louisiana

349

holding that suppletive law created “a continuing duty to refrain from
injuring or aggravating a servient estate,” which included the duty to
maintain canals and canal banks from eroding.53 By letting the canal widen
so far that it encroached on the servient estate was aggravation of the
servient estate, and therefore the contract was breached.54 However, the
contracts that did not state that the canal must not exceed a certain width
did not create an obligation to maintain the canals.55
The court also dismissed the tort claim holding that Louisiana law makes
a distinction between active and passive breaches of contract.56 In a tort
claim, an active breach is the only type of breach with merit.57 Failing to
maintain the canal was a passive, and not active, breach of contract.58
D. Solidarily Liability
Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Exploration, Inc.59
Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. (“Gloria’s Ranch) and Tauren Exploration, Inc.
(“Tauren”) entered into an oil and gas lease dated September 17, 2004,
covering approximately 1,390 acres for a primary term of three years.60 In
2006, Tauren assigned 49% of its interest in the lease to Cubic Energy, Inc.
(“Cubic”).61 In March of 2007, Tauren and Cubic entered into a credit
agreement with Wells Fargo Energy Capital, Inc. (“Wells Fargo”) and used
its interest in the subject lease as collateral.62 Multiple wells were drilled on
the property to the Cotton Valley formation.63 While the lease was still in
its primary term, Chesapeake Operating, Inc. had completed wells in the
Cotton Valley formation in sections of land that were unitized with the
subject land, which was later unitized in the Soaring Ridge 15H unit that
was drilled into the Haynesville Shale formation.64 In 2009, Gloria’s Ranch
and Chesapeake entered into a top lease to cover Chesapeake’s operations
53. Id. at *7.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at *9.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 2017-1518, 2017-1519, 2017-1522 (La. 6/27/18); 2018 WL 3216497, reh’g granted
Gloria’s Ranch L.L.C., v. Tauren Exploration, Inc., 2017-C-1519; 2017-C-1518; 2017-C1522 (La. 09/07/2018); 2018 WL 4267316.
60. Id. at p.2, 2018 WL 3216497 at *2.
61. Id.
62. Id. at p. 2-5, *2-3.
63. Id. at p. 2, 2018 WL 3216497 at *3.
64. Id.
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in Section 21.65 Subsequently, Tauren assigned unto EXCO USA Asset,
Inc. (“EXCO”) 51% of its interest in Gloria’s Ranch’s lease in depths
below the base of the Cotton Valley formation.66 Wells Fargo released
Tauren’s interest from the mortgage and in return, received a net profits
interest in the shallow rights and an overriding in the deep rights.67
Gloria’s Ranch sent a letter to Tauren, Cubic, EXCO, and Wells Fargo
asking for information on the revenue and expenses of the wells on the
lease because they believed that the lease had expired for not producing in
paying quantities.68 Tauren responded to their letter, determining that the
lease was producing profitably.69 Gloria’s Ranch responded by asking for a
recorded release of the lease, which did not occur.70 The trial court found
that the lease had indeed expired in depths below the Cotton Valley Sand,
and expired in as to all depths in Sections 9, 10, 16, and 21 since there was
no producing in paying quantities on those wells.71
The trial court found that Wells Fargo was solidarily liable because the
mortgage on Cubic’s interest contained an assignment of the lease, the
mortgage stated that the lease could not be released without prior consent
from Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo had an override and a net profits interest in
the lease, and it received cost information from the other defendants.72
Wells Fargo argued that it did not receive an assignment of the lease, but
rather a security interest.73 The appellate court agreed with Wells Fargo
arguing that because the mortgage did not include an assignment of Cubic’s
working interest, it was not an assignment of the lease.74 The sole purpose
of the “assignment” language was to secure the loan by granting a security
interest in the leases.75 However, the court found that Wells Fargo did in
fact have some control over Cubic’s working interest as the mortgage
granted Wells Fargo the right to approve location and depth of wells and
the right to access the property at all times.76 Further, Wells Fargo had to
give written consent for any new operating agreements and amendments
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at p. 2-3, 2018 WL 3216497 at *2-*3.
Id. at P. 5-8, 2018 WL 3216497 at *3-*4.
Id. at p. 4, 2018 WL 3216497 at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at p. 5, 2018 WL 3216497 at *2.
Id. at p. 6, 2018 WL 3216497 at *3.
Id. at p. 7, 2018 WL 3216497 at *3.
Id. at p. 8-9, 2018 WL 3216497 at *4-*5.
Id.
Id. at p. 9 2018 WL 3216497 at *5.
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and written consent to release the lease.77 The appellate court found that
Wells Fargo had actually specifically denied the release of the lease and
affirmed the trial court’s finding that Wells Fargo was solidarily liable for
damages.78
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment as
to Wells Fargo.79 The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court’s
holding that Wells Fargo was not an assignee of the lease, but merely held a
security interest; however, the Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate
court’s conclusion that the rights that Wells Fargo did have under the
security agreement rose to the level of it obtaining ownership in the lease.80
The Supreme Court found that although Wells Fargo maintains some
control over the lease, the rights that they do have are traits of a security
right, and not ownership.81 The rights that they do have do not grant them
the right to explore for oil and gas, but rather the have interests related to
making sure the collateral is safeguarded.82 Gloria’s Ranch argued that
because Wells Fargo did not release the mortgage, there would be a cloud
on title and no one would want to lease the property.83 However, the
Supreme Court found that this argument failed because once the lease no
longer existed, the mortgage also no longer existed.84 Consequently, once
Cubic released the lease, the mortgage would no longer exist.85 Ultimately,
the Supreme Court found that Wells Fargo only had a security interest in
the lease, and therefore, was not solidarily liable for the mineral lessee’s
breach of not releasing the lease.86

77. Id. at p. 9-10 2018 WL 3216497 at *5.
78. Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 51,077, p. 32-33 (La. App. 2 Cir.
6/2/17); 2017 WL 2391927.
79. Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 2017-1518, 2017-1519, 2017-1522, p.
23 (La. 6/27/18); 2018 WL 3216497 at *12, reh’g granted Gloria’s Ranch L.L.C., v. Tauren
Exploration, Inc., 2017-C-1519; 2017-C-1518; 2017-C-1522 (La. 09/07/2018); 2018 WL
4267316
80. Id. at p. 9-10, 2018 WL 3216497 at *5.
81. Id. at p. 10, 2018 WL 3216497 at *5.
82. Id. at p. 11, 2018 WL 3216497 at *6.
83. Id. at p. 13, 2018 WL 3216497 at *7.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at p. 15, 2018 WL 3216497 at *8.
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III. Legislation
A. Pipeline Damage
Act No. 692 was enacted to protect pipeline infrastructure and penalize
those who trespass on, damage, or conspire to damage the pipelines.87 The
act establishes criminal punishment for anyone that trespasses or creates
“criminal damage” to critical infrastructure. The definition of “critical
infrastructure” was expanded to include pipelines.88 This act amended R.S.
14:61(B)(1), (C), and (D) and enacted R.S. 14:61(B)(3) and 61.1.89
According to Tyler Gray, attorney for the Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and
Gas Association, the criminalization of the conspiracy to damage
infrastructure was included to deter those who would pay third parties to
trespass on or damage a pipeline.90

87. 2018 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 692 (H.B. 727) (West).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Steve Hardy, Environmentalists See Proposed Louisiana Law to Protect Pipelines
and Penalize Protestors as Overreach, THE ADVOCATE (Mar. 31, 2018, 2:11 PM),
https://www.advocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_1b087942-34ee-11e88dcb-2b3538173f63.html.
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